


PROGRAM: MEET THE PRESS	DATE: October 24, 1965
STATION OR NETWORK: WRC-TV, NBC-TV	TIME: 1:00 P.M.

STATINTL



Guest: Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Panel of reporters: Sander Vanocur, NBC News.
Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News,
John Hightower, Associated Press.
Philip Geyelin, Wall Street Journal
Moderator: Lawrence E. Spivak.

QUESTION: Do you take the whole Dominican experience as
a real sample of our policy across the hemisphere --

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: I would hope not, and I hope that
because of the fast moving events there, the difficulties of
communication and understanding in Washington -- what was going
on -- which they later did, I think, develop -- I said that I
could see the President had great difficulty in taking any
other decision in view of the advice he got, and the kind of
reports that he had. I think that was quite true. We made
this judgment, long after the fact, and after long hearings.
Here is the question of evaluating just exactly what they did
do, and what the situation was. And I think that this is a
proper way to proceed, and there's no other way to proceed.
We didn't have these facts before.

HIGHTOWER: Senator, one of the bases of the administration's
position or defense of its position, in the Dominican matter,
was the question of the extent of communist involvement. In the
administration's view, this was very large, and created a
danger that the country might go communist. To what extent
do you think this danger existed?

FULBRIGHT: Well there were communist presence, but I
think they exaggerated their significance, and I do not believe
they dominated the movement. I think part of the interpretation
of this goes back to the fact that Bosch was actually elected by
a large majority. We supported him. He was the legally

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constituted government. He was thrown out by the military, and I think it's quite natural -- human nature -- that the PRD, the party of Bosch, would seek to regain their power. I think they were the dominant characters. And Milena Urena (?) and even Camanno, were never accused of being communist. In the first days, after the rebellion, it was indicated by CIA and others, that there were very few. And later, upon reconsideration and further study, they decided there were as many as -- I think -- 57. But I think they pay the communists too great a compliment in assuming that even 57 would probably dominate a movement in which there were thousands involved, and not all of them were insignificant characters in the former government.

HIGHTOWER: Senator, I'd like to shift the target now -- in your recent speech defending your determination to speak out, you said, many of the letters I received on an earlier speech, expressed concern about the role of the Department of Defense, and the role of the Central Intelligence Agency, in the conduct of American foreign policy. Since you saw fit to include this in your speech, I assume you feel there is some significance in these comments.

What do you conceive to be this role?

FULBRIGHT: Of the military and CIA?

HIGHTOWER: Of the military and CIA.

FULBRIGHT: I don't think they should be too prominent in policy making. Of course the military, traditionally should be subject to civilian policy making, and the CIA is supposed to be an intelligence agency only, and not an operating agency in the execution of foreign policy. I think there is a feeling -- perhaps I reflect my own feeling -- that they're very prominent in these matters.

HIGHTOWER: Well may I ask, specifically sir, do you think that the Department of Defense and/or the CIA have a decisive influence in determining U. S. policy in Viet Nam?

FULBRIGHT: I think they have a very great part --

HIGHTOWER: Do you think they have too great an influence?

FULBRIGHT: Well, I would prefer that the civilian agencies be the major and decisive influence, because I doubt very much that a military decision can really improve the situation there in that area. I think it is largely a political decision, political settlement -- social and political -- that will finally

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bring about some stability in the area.

NIGHTCOWER: Do you have a feeling that there's an imbalance, however, developed, as say between the State Department and the Defense Department?

FULBRIGHT: Well I think this has been developing. When you consider 50 per cent of our budget is controlled by the Defense Department, with influences throughout this country, and the Secretary of Defense is an extremely able man, with great persuasive powers -- much more so than we have normally found in that position. It's a combination of those elements. I don't wish to criticize him as such -- I think he's a very fine and efficient administrator, as head of the Defense Department. This is a matter of judgment, as to whether or not you think that the military actions, intervention, can solve these problems, and it is the way to approach them. Now we -- as I said before -- we were injected into this area, this administration was -- they didn't create it, and they have to now meet the military threat. But this, I think, should be minimized and subjected to long term political policy.

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